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This thesis discusses some of the anomalies observed in economics in general. Anomalies 
are classified as behavior that is contradictory to utility theory and/or Nash equilibrium 
behavior. The thesis reviews an experiment and classifies some of the anomalies detected 
through the experiment. The experiment is based on a two stage R&D game, allowing firms to 
cooperate in R&D. Risk is introduced for the firms through random variables. This thesis 
looks at models that can be used to explain anomalies. Most successful were the models 
allowing loss aversion and risk aversion when subjects cooperate in R&D. On the other hand, 
the attempts were less successful in most cases where subjects did not cooperate in R&D.  
 
 






Have you ever wondered why a person would be risk averse with potential gains, but 
would be risk loving with potential losses? Or why people keep holding on to bad choices or 
bad portfolios?  Or why people never would dream of selling that old wine they have stored in 
the cellar, but would never buy an equal one in the store? Why do people behave in a way that 
we as economists would consider to be irrational? These are some of the questions I will 
explore in this thesis. 
Students of economics are taught to think of economics as an a priori science, with well-
defined utility curves, rational agents and assuming that every agent has complete knowledge. 
Economists use the concept of homo economicus, a rational agent that care nothing for the 
welfare of others and have the ability to make perfect decisions, acting as if they used game 
theory in social interaction. Economics is a very theory-intensive field and less observation-
intensive, perhaps more so than most other sciences. “Consequently, we come to believe that 
economic problems can be understood fully just by thinking of them. After the thinking has 
produced sufficient technical rigor, internal coherence and interpersonal agreement, 
economists can then apply the results to the world of data”. (Vernon, 1989).  
Most, if not all, economic models have the same axiomatic theory as a foundation. Most 
theory that has to do with the interaction of subjects uses Nash predictions as a metric for 
dominant strategies. How correct is the Nash prediction when confronted with data? And how 
rational are subjects? Are we consistent in some of the mistakes we make, or to paraphrase 
the title of a recent bestseller, are we “predictably irrational”? How can such observations 
carve the way for future economic interpretation?  
This thesis will try to analyse the reasons that anomalies occur. Theory and empirical data 
are often not in accordance with each other. With many anomalies identified, can economists 
make better predictions about subjects’ behavior? The question is then how to proceed. With 
so many observations and classifications of anomalies from experimental economics, the 
implication for theory is not clear? “Attention then turns to the theory. What implication for 
economic theory do the experimental results have? Perhaps none.” (Samuelson, 2005). What 
can experimental economics then do for theory and what can theory do for experimental 




This master thesis is organized in the following way: chapter 2 discusses some of the 
reasons for conducting experiments. Chapter 3 explores some of the anomalies observed 
through experiments and review some relevant experiments conducted earlier. In chapter 4 the 
model and predictions are presented. This chapter also reviews some of the anomalies that 
might occur in the kind of experiments reported in this thesis and how to identify and classify 
these anomalies. Chapter 5 reports the results of the experiments and comment upon these 
results. Chapter 6 is an overall summary, with some discussion and conclusions based on the 
previous chapters. 
1.1 Motivation 
The motivation for this master thesis comes from participating as a subject in an 
experiment conducted by Stein Østbye and Matt Roelofs in spring 2008. The experimental 
testing of theory predictions immediately spiked my interest. I participated in as many 
seminars in the field as I could. Unfortunately, the University of Tromsø does not offer any 
courses in behavioral and experiment economics. In fall of 2010 I was invited to participate in 
another experiment conducted by Stein and Matt, this time assisting in the creation of the 
experiment. My main contribution was programming of the code for the computerized 
experiment, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). I also participated in discussions about the 
design and organization of the experiment. In the fall of 2010, I attended in the 5
th
 Nordic 
Conference on Behavioral and Experimental Economics in Helsinki. On the conference, Stein 
presented some preliminary results from our experiment that this master thesis is based on.  
In the master program in economics at University of Tromsø the students can only choose 
one topic of interests to specialize in (except for the master thesis itself). I chose to read and 
write about experimental economics, to further my knowledge. After analysing the data 
gathered from the experiment, I could not fathom why the subjects on average did not choose 
to play according to the Nash equilibriums. I wished to go in depth of the subjects’ choices. 
Being invited to work with Stein and Matt, has been decisive for choosing experimental 
economics as the topic for my master thesis. 





2. Experimental Economics 
“Experiment! Make it your motto day and night. Experiment, and it will lead you to the 
light… If this advice you only employ, the future will offer infinite joy, and merriment… 
Experiment… And you’ll see!” 
-Cole Porter 
Experimental economics presents the tools needed to among other things empirically test 
theory predictions. Through experimental economics, it is possible to construct experiments 
that engage only a small piece of the world, thereby allowing the restriction of effects that 
might affect the theoretical models (Vernon, 1989). 
Vernon L. Smith (1994) identified seven major reasons why economists conduct 
experiments. He argued that there are more. 
“1. Test a theory or discriminate between theories.” We can use experiments to compare 
the predictions and outcomes from different models, to confirm the validity of different 
theoretical models. 
“2. Explore the causes of a theory’s failure.” When observations are different than theory 
predictions, one must make sure that it is the predicted failure is due to the failure of theory. If 
the failure is due to the theory failing, this can help to generate a new and more accurate 
theory.  
“3. Establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory.” For fields that range 
beyond the constraints of current theory, we can construct experiments to predict outcomes. 
We may investigate the effects of different incentives programs, different action and so on. 
The experiment in this thesis investigates the competition between firms.  
“4. Compare environments.” Comparing environments means to studies the outcome of 
models with changing the set up of the experiment. How the number of participants, payoffs 
and asymmetrical knowledge influence the theoretical models. 
“5. Compare institutions.” Comparing institutions means to study outcomes of different 
models when everything else is the same (ceteris paribus). An example: with the same 




there be a different outcome in an English or a Dutch auction? Experiment could be use to 
determine which would be the most efficient.  
“6. Evaluate policy proposals.” Experiments can be used to explore how different 
policies will affect market efficiency or resource allocation. 
“7. The laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design.” Laboratories can be used 
as a testing ground to examine the performance and efficiency of new forms of markets and 
exchanges.  
2.1 Economic experiments distinctive features 
Economics first learned the principals of experiments from psychology. Vernon Smith 
learned some of the techniques from psychologist Sidney Siegel. Since then, experimental 
economics have developed their own laboratory techniques different than those of cognitive 
and social psychology (Vernon, 1994).  
There are four principal methodological differences (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001): 
1. Script versus open-ended: Economists describe the details of the experiment through 
written instructions. Psychologists seldom use written instructions. 
2. Repeated trails versus one-shot: Economists usually repeat trails to make sure subjects 
adjust to the environment and understand the task at hand. Psychologists usually just give 
subjects only one trail at a particular task.  
3. Salient pay:  Economists usually pay subjects cash to participate in an experiment, 
where the amount is usually based on the performance of the subject. Psychologists usually 
do not pay cash, but if they do it is usually a flat fee.  
4. Deception: A large fraction of social psychology experiments are based on deceiving 





2.2 Nobel prize 
In 2002 Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith received the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
Daniel Kahneman received it: “for having integrated insights from psychological research 
into economics science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under 
uncertainty”. Vernon L. Smith received it: “for having established laboratory experiments as 







“Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) 
behavior can be explained by assuming that rational agents with stable, well-defined 
preferences interact in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an 
anomaly if it is difficult to “rationalize” or if implausible assumptions are necessary to 
explain it within the paradigm.” 
-Richard H. Thaler 
3.1 Endowment effects 
The endowment effect is the effect of valuing something that you have been given 
(initially endowed with) at a higher value than the acquiring value. In “common” tongue it is 
called sentimental value. Endowment effects are driven not only by subjects’ value of an 
object, but the pain of parting with it (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). 
Knetsch and Sinder (1984) made an interesting experiment that demonstrates endowment 
effects. The experiment took place in two undergraduate classes where the students were 
asked to fill out a questionnaire. The students were immediately given a gift as a “thank you” 
for participation. One group received a mug, while the other group received a large bar of 
Swiss chocolate. At the end of the session the students in both classes where given the choice 
to trade their mugs for chocolate or chocolate for mugs (depending on what gift they were 
initial endowed with). Approximately 90 percent of the students did not change their gifts. 
What does economic theory predict will happen in such a market? With transaction cost at an 
insignificant value, the students should exchange gifts to their most preferred one. Hence the 
average exchange over the two groups should be approximately 50 percent.  If one gift was 
preferred over the other gift, then they should have observed more exchange in the student 
group which received the “undesirable” good. With the exchange rate being approximately 90 
for both groups, the main effect of endowment is not enhancing the appeal of the good one 
owns, only the pain of giving it up (Lowenstein & Kahneman, 1991).  
Equally a wine collector would not part with an old wine bottle he was endowed with 





3.2 Status Quo Effect 
The status quo effect is the effects that subjects do not wish to deviate from their current 
state. These effects are usually driven by the “fear” of leaving the current state even if there 
may be a better choice. With risk involved, the “what if” is the major driving factor here. 
What if my current choice turns out to be better than the another option (Kahneman, et al., 
1991)? 
In the 1960’s and 1970’s there was a TV game show called “Let’s Make a Deal”. The 
game show is famous for their “lottery”. The participant could choose from one of three 
doors. Behind one of the doors was a car, which was the valuable prize in the game. Behind 
the two remaining doors, there were undesirable items referred to as “zorks”. For all intents 
and purposes the “zorks” where worthless. The way this game was played was as follows: 
first the participant chose a door. This door was not immediately opened.  The host would 
open one of the doors that the participant did not choose and that did not contain the prize. 
Now the participant was given the choice to switch from her original choice to the other 
unopened door. If the participant had full information about the game (except where the prize 
was), should she switch?Two aspects made this game so interesting compared to similar 
games. First, there was only one real prize. You could either get nothing or take it all. Second, 
the setup of this game was very different from other comparable games where you were given 
the option of changing away from you first choice. 
This game is easily solved by using Bayes’ rule. By this procedure you find that if you 
switch away from your first chosen door,  you double your chances of winning (Page, 1998),  
(Morgan, Chaganty, Dahiya, & Doviak, 1991).What was stopping the participant form 
switching to the other unopened door? This game caused a lot of debate even among 
statisticians, mathematicians and economists. If the scientists can not solve this problem on 
the spot, how can we expect the participant to do so? When there is uncertainty about what’s 
the dominant strategy, other effects start playing a role. In this case the Status Quo effect will 
play a major role. Consider these two outcomes. The subject does not switch and loses. Or the 
subject switches and loses. These two examples have exactly the same outcome: the subject 
loses. Most people choose not to switch because if you switch and lose that outcome would 
feel worse than not switching and losing. This will motivate many participants to not switch, 




3.3 Loss aversion 
Loss aversion implies that the impact of a difference on a dimension is generally greater 
when that difference is evaluated as a loss than when the same difference is evaluated as a 
gain  (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Loss or gain is not evaluated at your current 
endowment (ie. your wealth), just as a momentary loss or gain. Loss aversion can be regarded 
as feeling a loss as worse than an equal gain. For example, the pain of losing $ 50 feels worse 
than the joy of finding $ 50.  
Loss aversion can be mathematically presented as in equation (1) (Thaler, Tversky, 
Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). In this equation   represents the change in value, be it money 
or other desirable goods. This is normalized on the current level of endowments. Hence it is a 
value function rather than a utility function. For gains, the value of x is positive. Then x is set 
in the power of        . This makes the value of gains a concave function. For losses, the 
value of x is negative. The value function specifies that for negative values of x one should 
use the negative of the negative, hence the absolute values of x. This is set in the power of 
       . Which will give us a convex utility function for loses. This value function also has 
a slope change at the origin presented by    .  
      
                          
                  
         (1) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated the parameters of this value function. In their 
experiment they estimated both   and   to be 0.88 and   to be 2.25. They conclude that a 
subject consider a loss to be over twice as bad as an equal gain. But the rate of which a loss or 






Figure 1: Loss aversion value function. (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) 
Figure 1 is a lot steeper on the loss side than the gain side. This breaks with normal utility 
theory. Normal utility theory assumes positive but diminishing returns of money. A loss or a 
gain should be valuated as a change in total wealth and not from any normalized reference 
point. Normal utility theory states that the loss of $ 50 will give a greater absolute change in 
utility than the equal gain of $ 50. This can be expressed mathematically as in equation (2). 
                                (2) 
Assuming that equation (1) holds for all positive values of  , any agent should have a 
value function corresponding to figure 2, expressed by a smooth graph without any breaks 
points, that is concave for all endowment values.   
Loss aversion is driven by agents feeling of defeat and their wish to avoid it. An example 
on the feeling of loss comes in the next sub chapter (3.4 Framing effects). 





3.4 Framing effects  
Framing effects refers to decision making problem that occurs when an experiment with 
expected outcome and probabilities is framed in different ways. Subjects tend to reverse 
decisions based on perceived of their choices giving losses or gains. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) presented two problems (Figure 3):  
 
Figure 3: Framing effects. Presented to humans 2  
This hypothetical question was raised in an experiment by Tversky and Kahneman. The 
experiment was conducted with two different students groups. Their aim was to compare 
these two different problems, and the ways the students perceived them. We can agree that 
option A and C are the same, and B and D are the same. As stated in both problems, 600 
people are expected to die. If A is adopted then 400 will die, hence 200 will be saved. C is 
then just A, only that C focuses on the fact that people will be saved and A focuses on the fact 
that people will died. In the same way B and D are just two sides of the same story. It is 
interesting to note that problem 1 and 2 are just the reversal of each other. We should expect 
that subjects would prefer one option either A and C or B and D. However when problem is 
presented as a loss (i.e. “people will die”), then 78% prefer the risky option. On the contrary, 
the problem presented as a gain (i.e. “people will be saved”) only 28% preferred the risky 
option. Tversky and Kahnemans experiment was a hypothetical one.  
The drawback of a hypothetical experiment is that the subject’s choices does not have any 




to the participating subjects. Interestingly enough this kind of behavior is not just observed in 
humans, but also observed in monkeys behavior (Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2011). 
Monkeys where trained to use money (tokens) for which they could buy food. In the first 
experiment the monkeys could choose to buy food from person A or person B. Person A 
would receive the monkeys with one piece of apple. If the monkeys bought that piece of 
apple, they would receive one additional piece of apple. Therefore the monkeys would always 
receive two pieces of apple with certainty from person A. Alternatively they could buy from 
person B. Person B would present the monkeys with one piece of apple. If the monkeys would 
buy from person B, they would receive one piece of apple and with fifty/fifty chance they 
would receive two additional pieces apple. Therefore the monkeys would with equal 
probability receive either one piece of apple or three pieces of apple.  From person A the 
monkeys would receive a safe gain and from person B the monkeys would receive a risky 
gain. This experiment was conducted several times. This allowed monkeys to get used to the 
transaction with person A and person B. After a while the experiment was changed. Now the 
monkeys could chooses to buy from person C or D. Person C would present the monkeys with 
three pieces of apple. If the monkeys would buy from person C, then person C would remove 
one piece of apple. Therefore the monkeys would always receive two pieces of apple with 
certainty from person C. Alternatively they could buy from person D. Person D would present 
the monkeys with three pieces of apple. If the monkeys would buy from person D, then 
person D would with fifty/fifty chance remove two pieces of apple or not remove any pieces. 
Therefore the monkeys would with equal probability receive either one piece of apple or three 
pieces of apple. In these two different experiments option A and C has the same outcome. The 
monkeys would receive two pieces of apple with certainty. Likewise B and D has the same 
outcome. The outcome is with fifty/fifty chance to get one or three pieces of apple. As 





Figure 4: Framing effects. Presented to monkeys 3 
The result of this experiment was that choice D was significantly preferred to C. The 
monkeys preferred a risk loss to a sure loss. However the monkeys preferred choice A too 
choice B. Hence the monkeys preferred a safe gain over a risky gain. Humans display the 
same type of behavior (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Changing how the experiment was 
presented changed the choices of the monkeys. When the experiment was presented as 
gaining additional pieces of apples, the monkeys displayed risk averse behavior. When the 
experiment was presented as loss of pieces of apples, the monkeys displayed risk loving 
behavior. It is important to note that this “loss” of apple pieces was pieces of apples the 
monkeys never received. They where only presented with them when they bought at person C 
or person D. Rationally when one analyses this game one would assume that if one subjects 
prefers A over B, then he should prefer C over D and vice versa. There are two effects that 
play a role here. The first is the framing two different experiments. The two experiments are 
presented different, but have the same outcome. Subjects perceive two equal experiments as 
different, even if they are not. Since subjects perceive these experiments as gains and losses 
the second effect comes in to play, loss aversion. Losses are convex in the amount lost, this 
leads to the monkeys to try to avoid loss. Since losing two is less than twice as bad as losing 
one, then the monkeys risk it to try to avoid losing anything. But the framing effect is the 
dominant anomaly because the monkeys are “losing” something that they are not in 





3.5 The Ultimatum Game / Judgment of Fairness 
The ultimatum game is frequently referred to by economists. It has its own set anomalies 
(Thaler, 1988). The most distinct anomaly observed in this experiment is “fairness”. 
Economic models usually do not incorporate fairness, even if fairness seems to be a concept 
printed in the spine of most humans. The ultimatum game is a two stage, two player 
bargaining game, where one player (allocator) gets to divide a given sum of money between 
himself and the other player. The other player (recipient) may accept or reject the offer the 
allocator proposed. If the recipient accepts, he receives what the allocator offered him and the 
allocator receives the rest. If the recipient rejects the offer then both players receive nothing. 
How much should the allocator offer? The Nash prediction is found through backwards 
induction. The recipient should accept any positive offer. Because the recipient is better off 
with any positive amount of money than he is with zero. Hence the allocator can give any 
positive offer and assume that the recipient will accept the offer. The allocator should by these 
assumptions offer the smallest possible amount of money (epsilon) to the recipient. There is 
one flaw with this Nash equilibrium. At this equilibrium it only costs the recipient a very 
small amount of money (epsilon) to reject the allocator’s offer. People have a concept of 
fairness that is not captured in this Nash prediction. Let’s dabble a little outside of the 
equilibrium prediction. The allocator should offer more than epsilon, but how much more? 
Let’s examine some experimental work in this field.  
The first experiment conducted in this field (as told by Thaler) was Güth, Schmittberger 
and Schwarze (1982). They ran an ultimatum experiment with 42 economic students. Half of 
the where designated as allocator and the other half where designated as recipients. Each 
allocator received c amount of German marks, they were asked to divide the money as they 
wished between himself and the corresponding recipient. Like a normal ultimatum game, the 
recipients were given the choice either to accept or decline the allocators’ offer. If the 
recipients rejected the allocators’ offer, then both recipients and allocators would receive 
nothing.  If the offer was accepted by the recipients, then the allocator would receive the 
allotted money subtracted by what he offered the recipient, and the recipient would receive 
what was offered to him. The mean offer in this experiment was 37% of the allotted money. 
In 7 of the 21 pairs the allocator offered half of the allotted money. In only two cases did the 
allocator offer nothing to the recipient, in one of these cases the recipient accepted the zero 




would give the subjects more time to think about the experiment and “what they should have 
done”.  
In the experiment conducted one week later the mean offer decreased a little from the first 
experiment, but still a lot higher that the Nash equilibrium. The offers decreased from 37% 
offered to 32%. 5 of the 21 offers that were rejected. The mean of the rejected offers where 
about 10%. Both the allocator and the recipients have shown behavior inconsistent with the 
Nash prediction. It is easy to interpret the actions of the recipients. They were willing to 
sacrifice an offer of 10% rather then accept an unfair offer. This can be interpreted as the 
recipients are saying “take your offer of epsilon and shove it!”(Thaler, 1988). The allocators 
could be motivated by two different effects. Firstly the allocators could have a sense of 
fairness. Secondly the allocators could be worried that the recipient would reject offers that 
they considered to be unfair.  
In another ultimatum experiment by (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), they studied 
if subjects would still behave fair even if the recipient could not decline the offer. The 
allocator had two different choices to divide $ 20 between him and the recipient. The 
allocators could take $ 18 and giver their partner $ 2 or split the amount evenly, $ 10 each. 
Even if the recipient did not have the chance to decline the offer, 76% of the allocators 
divided the $ 20 evenly. Thereafter, the allocators were organized into two groups: the “fair” 
ones that split the money evenly and the “unfair” ones that kept $ 18 for themselves. A third 
group of students were given two options. First option was to take $ 6 themselves and give $ 
6 to a random allocator that was designated as “unfair”. The second option was to take $ 5 
themselves and give $ 5 to a random allocator that was designated as “fair”. The question is 
simple, would this subject be willing to sacrifice one dollar to punish one allocator that had 
been greedy? 74 percent chose to receive one dollar less and split with a “fair” allocator rather 
than let a greedy allocator receive more money. 
3.6 Risk aversion 
Risk aversion is the assumption that risk gives in some way disutility. Hesitation over 
risky monetary prospects even when they involve an expected gain – will not strike most 
economists as surprising (Rabin & Thaler, 2001). Economists can even explain this type of 
risk aversion with expected utility maximising agents. Consider the follow problem. You may 




A. You are given $ 50 with certainty.  
B. Fifty/fifty chance of receiving $ 100 or receiving nothing.  
Which option gives the highest expected utility? Option A is will always give the subject 
       . While option B the expected utility is       
        
 
 
      
 
. The utility from $ 0 
is zero. Hence the expected utility from option B can be written as      
        
 
. 
Utility theory assumes concave utility function. Utility is always positive with more 
money, but is marginally decreasing. With these assumptions we can conclude 
that                        . Hence                   . This implies that 
option A gives a higher expected utility than option B, even if they both have the same 
expected payoff. This is known as risk aversion.  
In the example above option A was the best choice for a risk averse agent. A risk neutral 
agent would be indifferent between the two choices, since risk would not matter to such an 
agent. If an agent would prefer option B over option A he would be classified as risk loving, 
hence such an agent would receive utility from risk. The most usual assumption are risk 
averse agents, as demonstrated in the example above. Violations of this assumption are 
observed every day. People still buy lottery tickets that have high risk and lower expected 
payoff than the cost of a lottery ticket. This can hardly be classified as irrational. Rabin and 
Thaler demonstrate that the concave utility function is quickly violated (Rabin & Thaler, 
2001).  
Assume that we know that our subject Johnny is a risk averse utility maximising agent. 
We know that he will always turn down a gamble with fifty/fifty chance of losing $ 10 or 
winning $ 11. Consider the following problem; Johnny is offered a bet with fifty/fifty chance 
where he can lose $ 100 or win an amount of $ Y (Rabin & Thaler, 2001).  
From the description above, what is the biggest Y such that we know Johnny will turn 
down a 50-50 lose $100/ win $Y bet?(Rabin & Thaler, 2001). 
a) $ 100 
b) $ 221 
c) $ 2,000 




e) $ 1.1 million 
f) $ 2.5 billion 
g) Johnny will reject the bet no matter what Y is. 
h) We can’t say without more information about Johnny’s utility function. 
What would you think Johnny would choose? Rabin and Thaler concluded that Johnny 
will turn down any bet with 50 percent risk of losing at least $100, no matter how high the 
upside is. Hence the correct answer is g). Johnny would of course be insane to turn down 
offers like d, e and f. Why can we conclude that g) is the correct answer? This has to do with 
Johnny’s diminishing return of money. For Johnny to turn down 2.5 billion dollars, it has to 
be a staggering diminishing return. From the first bet Johnny turned down, we can conclude 
the following:                             . Hence Johnny values a 
dollar between W and W + $11 by at most 10/11 as much as a dollar between W and W – $ 
10. Johnny should turn down the same bet (lose $ 10 / win $ 11) at wealth level W + $21. 
Hence Johnny values a dollar between W + $11 and W + $21 by at most 10/11 as must as a 
dollar between W + 21 and W + 32. This leads to valuing the next $ 11 a most 10/11 as much 
as the previous $ 10. This becomes a converging geometric series. The sum of a convergent 
geometric series is     
 
   














       
 
    
  
     (3) 
Equation (3) states that for infinite times of receiving $ 11, Johnny can at most only value 
infinite money ten times as much as the first $ 11. Hence a loss that is ten times bigger as the 
loss of the first $ 10, can never be compensated. Such an absurdly high diminishing return of 
money leads to an absurdly high risk aversion. Rejection of the first bet (lose $ 10 / win $ 11) 
describes the attitude most people have to risk. Rejection of the second bet (lose $ 100 / win $ 
∞) describes nobody.  
 3.8 Cooperation 
Most of micro economic theory and all game theory is based the assumption that people 
are rational profit maximising agents. In other words, people are selfish and care nothing for 




that the subjects should defect. People are assumed to have no qualm about their failure to do 
“the right thing”(Dawes & Thaler, 1988).  
This anomaly is often violated. Charitable organizations receive enough money to 
continue their work. People vote in elections even if it is improbable that a single vote will 
alter the outcome. Farmers coordinate leaving land fallow, even if a single farmer has 





4. Models and Predictions 
This chapter is based on the predictions, results and anomalies for a new research and 
development (R&D) experiment conducted by Østbye, Roelofs and Heen. This theoretical 
model is based on the same model used in Clark et al (2010), with one major change: firms 
were given the option to cooperate in R&D, if they wished to do so. This experiment 
investigated whether or not firms would be willing to cooperate when it is in their best interest 
to do so (or if they are willing to share R&D even it is not in their best interest to do so). The 
experiment also investigates how product market competition affects the firms’ R&D 
behavior and how cooperation agreements affect spending R&D. 
This experiment was conducted at Western Washington University autumn 2010. One 
hundred students participated. The preliminary results were presented at the 5
th
 Nordic 






4.1 The model 
As described by Østbye and Roelofs (2011), the model is based on the interaction between 
two firms. The two firms compete to enter a product market. The firms must have a successful 
innovation in order to enter the market. The firms possess some initial knowledge and can 
increase their knowledge through two means: knowledge sharing or research (investing in 
R&D). The initial knowledge can be divided equally, representing firms that are on the same 
technology level. If the initial knowledge is divided unequally then it represents firms that are 
on different technology levels. For a firm to be successful in innovation, the firm must 
possess a level of total knowledge that exceeds a threshold which is not known ex-ante. This 
way, uncertainty is introduced into the model. The threshold which determines success or 
failure is randomly drawn for a uniform distribution between [0, 1]. Since this number is 
drawn from zero to one, the level of total knowledge can be interpreted as the probability of 
success.  
The gross profit of firms depends on the type of market formed and the competition 
intensity. If only one firm is successful in getting an invention, then that firm will capture the 
whole market by itself, creating a monopoly. Monopoly profit is normalized to 1     . If a 
firm is not successful in getting an invention, then that firm will not receive any profits. 




an invention they will form a duopoly in the product market. The payoff in the duopoly 
market      depends on the competition intensity. Competition intensity in the product 
market can take one of three forms: Soft, Moderate or Tough. Soft competition corresponds to 
collusion. In collusion the two firms split the market equally and receive half the monopoly 
profits each. Hence the profit in a Soft market is 0.5. Tough competition corresponds to 
Bertrand competition. In Bertrand markets there is no profit for any firm. Hence the profit for 
Tough competition is zero. In addition to Soft and Moderate there is also a case called 
moderate with profit of 0.3. The net profit of a firm is the profit receive in the market 
(whether it be zero or positive) subtracted by the cost of investing in R&D. The relationship 
between investment in R&D and the knowledge generated from it is for simplification 
assumed one to one. Investment in R&D will henceforth be referred to as R&D. 
Cooperation is introduced by allowing the firms to exchange the knowledge generated by 
R&D, this will be known as Sharing. This model does not incorporate any other binding ways 
of cooperating. Hence even if the firms cooperate by exchanging knowledge, they still face 
the same competition in the duopoly market.  
Let us now look at the model in more detail. Formalizing the probability of success is 
given by the cumulative density function: 
                                  (4) 
In equation (4)    is  R&D and    is initial knowledge for firm i. The parameter    
represents whether or not the firms exchange knowledge. If the firms do not exchange 
knowledge,   takes the value 0. Hence firm j’s R&D does not affect firm i’s probability of 
success, when there is NO Sharing. If the firms cooperate in R&D   takes the value 1. Hence 
firm j’s R&D increases firm i’s probability of success, when there is Sharing. Equation (4) 
represents the probability of success, hence    cannot take a value greater than one. If the sum 
on the right hand side should sum up to more that one, then    is set to one.  
Since the randomly drawn threshold is different for the two firms, the probability of 
success for the two firms is independent from each other. Hence the expected net profit for 
firms i can be written as: 








The first term in equation (5)             , is the expect net profit from becoming a 
monopolist. The second term          is the expected net profit from forming a duopoly (i.e. 




 represents the costs of R&D. The cost of 
R&D is hence convex in R&D level.  
Since the firms face two different randomly drawn thresholds for success, this can lead to 
the firm with the least knowledge to be successful in innovation and the leading firm to be 
unsuccessful. It is not always the firm that has conducted the most research in a field that has 
commercial success.  
Substituting equation (4) into equation (5) yields equation (6) 




  (6) 
The first order condition that maximizes expected profit for firm i given firm j’s R&D 
level, gives firm i’s best response to firm j. 
    
   
            
         
                         
           
  (7) 
From equation (7) we observe the conclusion that the firms R&D are strategic substitutes, 
since the term                 is negative. If firm j increases R&D, firm i best response 
would be to reduce R&D. The best response for firm i to an increase in firm j’s R&D can be 
written as:  
   
   
 
              
           
     (8) 
By finding the first derivative of the reaction function equation (7), we need only to 
examine if the equation is positive or negative. Equation (6) is negative, hence we can 
mathematically conclude that the firms R&D level are compliments. For no exchange of 
knowledge       and for increasing market intensity, both increase how strongly the firms 
complement each other. 
Equation (8) is the best response for firm i no firm j’s R&D. By swapping i and the j we 
get the best response for firm j to firm i’s R&D. We obtain the equilibrium values of R&D for 




   
                                     
                             
             
 
                
 
         
Substituting for the specific parameters values, we obtain the equilibrium values for any 
of the different cases we consider. The different cases depend on: competition intensity, 
cooperative agreement and initial knowledge. In this experiment total initial knowledge is 0.2. 
If total initial knowledge is divided equally then both firms start with 0.1            . If 
total knowledge is divided unequally then one firm receives all the total initial knowledge of 
0.2 and the other firm receives zero. The firm that receives all total knowledge will be 
designated the “Leader”, the other firm will be designated the “Laggard”.  
See appendix for calculation. 
4.2 Predictions 
This thesis is about anomalies observed in economics. Deviation from Nash predictions 
are defined as anomalies. The following sub chapters will describe anomalies that might be 
observed in the experiment. 
4.2.1 Nash equilibrium 
Substituting specific values for the parameters used in the experiments in to equation (9), 
we obtain the Nash equilibrium for each specific case. These equilibria are presented in Table 
3 and Table 4. However, there may be other equilibrium concepts that potentially can mitigate the 
discord between the Nash predictions and data. 
4.2.2 Mean risk aversion 
In this section a mean variance risk aversion is used to explore another potential 
equilibrium.  Finance portfolio theory assumes that an investor penalizes risk in his portfolio 
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2009). If there is no risk aversion, two investments that give the 
same expected payoff, should be equally as good regardless of risk. This is obviously not a 
reasonable assumption. An investor needs higher expected payoff to accept risk.In other 
words, an investor have some disutility from risk. With normal Nash equilibria there is only 
incorporated expected profit. Assuming that there is some disutility correlated with the 




                      
     (10) 
In equation 10 the variable A is a measure of risk aversion. The more risk averse an  
investor is, the larger the parameter A should be. If the investor is risk neutral then A is equal 
to zero. Hence the utility function would only be a function of expected payoff. Risk averse 
investors will have indifference as curves shown in Figure 5. If higher the value of A the more 
convext the utility curves would be.  
There are only three possible outcomes from this R&D game. The variance corresponding 
to the expected payoff can be found by using the variance for a discrete stochastic variable, 
given by equation 11.  
                 
     (11) 
Rewriting this from the formal expression from the R&D investment model, the variance 
of the payoff can be written as in equation (12): 
                                      
           
 
                          
 
                              
         (12) 
For simplification, we assume that your opponent always plays his Nash equilibrium 
investment level. Figure 6 and Figure 7 have plotted the expected profit with the 
corresponding variance. The graphs show what is your expected profit and variance for all 





level of investment in R&D. These graphs illustrate two cases where the subjects do not share 
knowledge. The duopoly market payoff is 0.3 (Moderate competition) and initial knowledge 
is asymmetric at the level 0.2 for the Leader and 0 for the Laggard.  
Depending on the firms’ preferences they may play Nash or under/over invest. 
Overinvestment is classified as investing more than the Nash equilibrium and 
underinvestment is investing less than the Nash equilibrium.  
 
Figure 6: Mean/risk possibility set. Moderate NO Sharing Laggard 
 






















































The graph for E(Pi) gives the loci of expected profit and variance for all levels of 
investment. The Nash equilibrium is represented by the red square. Since your opponent is 
assumed to play his Nash equilibrium, you maximize your expected profit by playing your 
Nash equilibrium. Hence the Nash equilibrium will always be the highest point on the graph. 
Zero investment in R&D (Xo) is represented by green triangle. Increasing your investment 
moves you away from Xo. Note that there two-dimensional representation does not display 
investment in R&D, only the expected profit with the corresponding variance. Both profit and 
variance are functions of investment.  
Let us look at the Laggards’ expected profit/risk graph first. Increasing investment from 
the Xo point, both the expected profit and the risk increase. Both expected profit and the risk 
increase until the investment level reaches the Nash equilibrium. Continuing increasing 
investment past the Nash equilibrium increases risk, but reduces expected profit. The 
conclusion is that every level of R&D over the Nash equilibrium is a dominated strategy. 
Instead of increasing the investment level of R&D, the firm may rather reduce its investment 
level. Both increasing and decreasing the investment level reduces the expected payoff, but 
only decreasing investment also reduces risk. Hence the investment level from zero to the 
Nash equilibrium dominates the investment levels that are higher than the Nash equilibrium.  
Next, let us look at the Leader. From Xo the expected profit and risk increase. But the risk 
only increases to a certain point. From that point the firms may invest more to increase profit 
and decrease risk. This is until Nash equilibrium is reached. From the Nash equilibrium 
investing more decreases both risk and profit. Overinvestment reduces expected profit and 
risk and underinvestment reduces expected profit and increases risk. Hence overinvesting is 
the dominant strategy. This analysis has been done for all cases that we will encounter in the 
later experiment. 
For this type of analysis there is no corresponding single equilibrium level for investment. 
Mean risk aversion is a matter of preference. If the subjects are risk neutral they should play 
their Nash equilibrium. If they are risk averse, then it is a question of how risk averse they are 
and what level they would prefer to choose.  
This analysis has been done for all cases. The result is given in the Table below. All the 




Table 1: Risk aversion with/without sharing 
Sharing  
 
NO Sharing  
Competition Role Prediction  
 
Competition Role Prediction  
Moderate Symmetric Over invest 
 
Moderate Symmetric Under invest 
Soft Leader Over invest 
 
Soft Leader Over invest 
  Laggard Over invest 
 
  Laggard Over invest 
Moderate Leader Over invest 
 
Moderate Leader Over invest 
 
Laggard Over invest 
  
Laggard Under invest 
Tough Leader Under invest 
 
Tough Leader Nash 
  Laggard Under invest 
 
  Laggard Nash 
 
In the NO Sharing case for Tough competitions, Nash has been classified as the strategy. 
This is because that the Nash equilibrium results in the Leader gaining a total knowledge of 
1000. This means that the Leader with certainty captures the market.  Hence the Laggard 
should invest 0. If the Laggard invests 0, then the Leader would just lower his expected profit 
by decreasing investment. Hence Nash would be the least risk and gives maximum profit. The 
same reason goes for the Laggard, if the Leader invests 800, then the Laggard can not 
increase expected profit by increasing investment. Hence the Nash would be the least risky 
and maximum give profit.  
4.2.1.1 An alternative approach to: Risk aversion 
After limited success with some of the models an alternative approach is used. Your 
investment can be seen as a lottery where there are only two outcomes of the random draw, 
you get a failure or you get a success. If you are unsuccessful, you must bear the cost of your 
investment (much like lottery tickets that did not win). If you were successful you receive the 
payoff in the market you enter (depending on if you are a monopolist or duopolist and the 
product market competition intensety in duopoly) and you bear the costs of your investment. 
In this model I will also introduce diminishing marginal returns, as is used in a normal utility 
function.  
A normal utility function                breaks down when x becomes a negative 
number. If you are unsuccessful in R&D your profit is negative and a normal utility function 
will not work. Hence this model will rather look at a change in total wealth rather than 




To deal with the problem of the normal utility function not being defined for negative 
values, every subject was initially endowed with some points. This served as a show up fee 
for the subjects and as a buffer to avoid the subjects going bankrupt. Hence the subjects have 
some initial endowment that prevents them from ending up with negative total wealth.  
                   
              
         (13) 
                                (14) 





In this model    is the profit a subject would receive if he/she is successful. The first 
factor of the first term is the utility of success. Multiplied by the probability of being 
successful, we have the expected utility of success. The second term is the corresponding 
expression for expected utility of failure.  
Unfortunately this model cannot be solved algebraically. Since each change in wealth 
term is to the power of  , we can not solve this for a value of x. What we can do is 
numerically analysis. The parameter   is assumed to be      . This analysis was 
preformed in Excel and gave conclusive results of subjects over or underinvestment behavior 
regardless of choice of a and I. The only difference observed changing these parameters was 
the level that should be invested, not a changed between over and underinvestment.  
Table 2: Alternative risk aversion 
Sharing  
 
NO Sharing  
Competition Role Prediction  
 
Competition Role Prediction  
Moderate Symmetric Over invest 
 
Moderate Symmetric Over invest 
Soft Leader Over invest 
 
Soft Leader Over invest 
  Laggard Over invest 
 
  Laggard Over invest 
Moderate Leader Over invest 
 
Moderate Leader Over invest 
 
Laggard Over invest 
  
Laggard Under invest 
Tough Leader Over invest 
 
Tough Leader Nash 
  Laggard Over invest 
 





From Table 2 the predictions that have changed has been marked with bold script. Those 
that have not been marked with bold script have the same prediction as the mean risk aversion 
model.  
Why is this risk aversion and not loss aversion? Loss aversion classifieds a loss as worse 
than an equal gain (chapter 3.3 for a closer description). Risk aversion in chapter 3.6 argues 
that between a bet of A receiving $ 50 dollars or B receiving with a fifty fifty chance $ 100 or 
$ 0, subjects would turn down B because B has lower expected utility. Equation (13) 
determines the expected utility for the new total wealth level. 
4.2.2 Cooperation 
Another “equilibrium” that might arise is a cooperative “equilibrium”. In a cooperative 
equilibrium subjects maximize joint profit. This means that subjects choose an investment 
level that is jointly best for both participants in the duopoly. This changes the profit function 
to become a joint profit function. A joint profit function incorporates both subjects’ profit: 
                (16) 
To maximize this profit function we follow the same procedure as for maximising the 
normal profit function. We know that we have reached the optimal point when the first 
derivative is equal to zero. This is an easy equilibrium to simulate numerically in excel. This 
equation has on weights for how the profit is distributed, it only maximizes the profit in the 
market.   
4.2.3 Equilibrium 
For expository purpose all numbers are multiplied by 1000. This has also been done for 
the subjects participating in the experiment. Choosing to invest 300 seems a lot more intuitive 





Table 3: Predicted equilibrium for Sharing 
Competition Role R&D Profit   
    Nash Coop Nash Coop n 
Moderate Symmetric 226 260 313 317 188 
Soft Leader 300 360 515 524 70 
  Laggard 300 360 315 324 70 
Moderate Leader 226 260 420 424 61 
 
Laggard 226 260 220 224 61 
Tough Leader 162 180 341 342 45 
  Laggard 162 180 141 142 45 
  
Table 4: Predicted equilibrium for NO Sharing 
Competition Role R&D Profit   
    Nash Coop Nash Coop n 
Moderate Symmetric 547 900/0* 204 525 / 30 132 
Soft Leader 733 800 416 680 90 
  Laggard 533 0 142 0 90 
Moderate Leader 780 800 461 680 99 
  Laggard 314 0 49 0 99 
Tough Leader 800 800 670 680 115 
  Laggard 0 0 0 0 115 
* The cooperative equilibrium for symmetric moderate is that one invests 900 and the other zero. 
The cooperation equilibrium for the NO sharing cases, is the Laggard investing nothing 
and the Leader taking it all. This hardly seems fair, but it is the investment level that 
maximizes joint profit. The Laggards expected profit is low compared to the expected profit 
for the Leaders. One might think that Laggard should just think “I’ll just not invest this round 
and not have any cost of R&D and let my opponent take it all”. The symmetric cooperative 
solution is that one player invests 900 and the other 0. Since the subject has no way of 
communication this is an equilibrium that will be impossible to coordinate upon. Hence 
cooperation on R&D level will most likely not be observed for NO sharing cases. 
4.2.4 Dominant strategies 
Since the subjects have the option to sharing knowledge , there will be a dominating 
strategies with the sharing of investment in R&D or not sharing of investment in R&D. 
Comparing the expected profit for the subjects with regards to sharing or no sharing, will 
reveal what strategy maximizes subjects expected profit. A Leader in a Soft market is 




share knowledge. For this treatment sharing knowledge is the dominant strategy. In Table 
5.2.4x finding the dominant strategy has been done for all cases.  
Table 5: Sharing dominant strategy 
Competition Role Dominant strategy 
Moderate Symmetric Share 
Soft Leader Share 
  Laggard Share 
Moderate Leader Not Share 
 
Laggard Share 
Tough Leader Not Share 
  Laggard Share 
 
Leader in the treatment for asymmetric Moderate and Tough markets are the only cases 
where firms have no incentive to share knowledge. Since the Leader does not have any 
incentives to share knowledge then there should not been any knowledge sharing in Moderate 
and Tough asymmetric markets. For the Moderate treatment the total amount of profit in a 
Sharing market is higher than in a No Sharing one. A side payment from the Laggard firm 
could lead to a pareto improvement. The side payment treatment is not incorporated in to this 
theses. This is in accordance with the Nash equilibrium predictions. Table 6 shows the mean 
profit in the experiment conducted by Clark, Østbye and Roelofs in 2010. From the Table one 
can see that the mean profit in all the sharing sessions gave higher profit than, any session 
where there was no sharing. Leader in Moderate and Tough markets should theoretically do 
better by not sharing, but the empirical evidence show that they received higher mean profit 
by sharing knowledge.  
Table 6: Profit in with Sharing and NO Sharing 
Competition Role Mean Profit 
    No sharing Sharing 
Moderate Symetric 215 301 
Soft Leader 314 497 
  Laggard 95 273 
Moderate Leader 291 396 
 
Laggard 68 201 
Tough Leader 297 409 





With this contradicting information the question becomes: “What is the Leader’s best 
choice?” This is not easy to answer ex-ante. This question will be explored in some detail in 
the result section. 
As stated, a side payment from the Laggard firm could lead to a pareto improvement. To 
prove this, consider the asymmetric Moderate treatment. For the sharing cases the expected 
profit for the Leader firms are 420 and 220 for the Laggard firms. For the no sharing cases the 
expected profit for Leader firms are 461 and 49 for the Laggard firm. The total profit in the 
sharing case is 640, but only 510 for the no sharing case. Assuming that the firms’ chooses 
their Nash equilibrium level of investment, the Laggard firm should be willing to pay the 
Leading firm at maximum 171 for the Leading firm to share knowledge. To accept knowledge 
sharing, the least amount the Leader firm should be willing to accept is 41. Since the least 
willingness to accept is smaller than the maximum willingness to pay, there should be sharing 
in markets that have side payments (like the real world).  
4.2.5 Loss aversion 
To use the Tversky and Kahneman (1991) definition of loss aversion for this experiment 
would prove difficult. After conversation with some of the students that participated in the 
experiment, one of them stated: “The worst ting was to not get a success” (ie. not being 
successful in R&D). Loss aversion in the simplest form can be explained as the feeling of 
defeat being the worst thing. Testing for loss aversion in this experiment will be done by 
assuming that there is some value of disutility associated with loss (i.e. not being successful in 
R&D).  




     (17) 
In equation (17)    has been added to the expected profit function. The payoff for failure 
has through the model been zero. This section assumes that    has some negative values that 
relates to subjects disutility with loss. Hence equation (17) becomes a utility function rather 
than an expected profit function.  
A utility maximizing agent maximizes his utility in the same way a profit maximizes 
profit.  
            
   




Solving equation (18) for   , we get.  
                                (19) 
The monetary loss of failure will be found based on the average investment of subjects. 
Hence    can only be found after conduction the experiment,    will be estimated based on 
empirical results.  
4.2.6 Team players and Induvidualist 
One hypothesis this experiment wishes to investigate if certain players can be classified as 
more cooperative than others. This model incorporates endogenous sharing. Hence I wish to 
tests the difference between the sharing decision and the investment decision. This will be 
done by separating the subjects by the frequency of offering to exchange knowledge with 
their counterpart. If players on average more often try to exchange knowledge with their 
counterpart, will they also choose a more cooperative investment level? We form a simple 
division. The first group is designated “Team player”, these are the subjects that most 
frequently offered to form cooperation in R&D. The second group is designated 
“Individualist”, they are the subjects that less frequent offer to form cooperation in R&D.  
4.3 The Experiment 
This experiment was conducted at Western Washington University in the fall of 2010. 
One hundred undergraduate students from introductory economics courses were recruited to 
participate. The students were divided into ten different groups, with ten students in each 
group. The experiment had five different types of treatment. Each treatment was run two 
times, with two different groups of students. The objective of the experiment was to observe 
the willingness for Leaders to cooperate with Laggards. Therefore only one symmetric 
treatment was conducted, to get a reference case that other cases can be compared against. In 
this master thesis, data for four of the five treatments will be used.  
4.3.1 Experimental Design  
There was a total of 16 periods in each experimental session. In each period the subjects 
were first asked if they wished to exchange R&D with their counterpart. The cooperation 
result of the first stage was immediately revealed. In the second stage the subjects were asked 




to any endowment of initial knowledge and any knowledge gained through knowledge 
exchange, to determine the subject’s total knowledge. 
To determine success or failure in investment, uniformly distributed random number was 
drawn [0, 1000]. A firm projects was successful if the total knowledge of the firm was greater 
than this random number. The firms faced different random drawn numbers. In the last stage 
the subjects were presented the result screen, informing the subjects of the resulting profit.  
In each period subjects were randomly paired with one other subject. The subjects were 
quasi randomly assigned to be Leader or Laggard. This was only quasi-random for two 
reasons. First of all, it was to make sure that every subject were equal numbers of times, 
Leader or Laggard. Second, it was to avoid that any subjects were Leader or Laggard too 
many times in a row. Subjects were informed in the first stage about the market intensity and 
whether they were a Leader or a Laggard. 
We presented the subjects to five different treatments. All of these were conducted twice.  
Table 7: Treatment types 
  Market Endowments 
Treatment 1 Moderate Symmetric 
Treatment 2 Soft Asymmetric 
Treatment 3 Moderate Asymmetric 
Treatment 4 Tough Asymmetric 
Treatment 5* Moderate Asymmetric 
(* Treatment 5 added a side payment for knowledge sharing) 
In Treatment 1 subjects had symmetric initial endowment of. This treatment served as a 
benchmark. Treatments 2-3 were asymmetric treatments with each one having one of the 
different market intensity. Treatment 5 had a side payment connected with cooperating in 
R&D. The Laggard had to pay 100 to the Leader to exchange knowledge. Both the Leader 
and the Laggard had to agree to exchange knowledge before there would be any exchange. 
This treatment was not included in this thesis. 
This economic experiment was programmed in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Z-tree is a 
ready-made toolbox for conducting economic experiments. The experiment was presented in 
such as way that the subjects had all the information they needed to reach their decisions. The 
game was presented in several stages. The information and options available to the subjects 




Equal information in all stages 
To avoid some confusion it is important to note that in this master thesis exchange of 
knowledge has been referred to as Sharing and cooperation will be referred to as choosing a 
joint profit maximizing R&D level. In the experiment Sharing or NO Sharing was reported as 
“cooperation status”, this refers to the exchange of knowledge. All stages have some common 
factors. Every stage showed the current period, the total number of periods and the time 
remaining in that stage. Every stage also informed the subjects about all endowments. The 
endowments tab showed: Payoff in the duopoly market, payoff in monopoly market, firms 
initial knowledge (yours and your opponent) and cooperation status. Cooperation status is not 
shown in the first stage for the obvious reason that this is where firms choose to cooperate or 
not. The firms are also given the information about how much in total profit they have. This 
information was presented in every stage.    
 
Figure 8: From the experiment: Endowments tab in the cooperation stage. 
 
 
Figure 9: From the experiment: Endowments tab in the investment and result stage. 
Sharing stage 
In the sharing stage the firms were given the option to share all R&D generated through 




cooperation for there to be cooperation. If one subject (or both) said “No” then neither of the 
two would share their knowledge. The question in this stage states “provided they share”, this 
is added to avoid a “Prisoners dilemma” situation. For everyone would surely be better off if 
your counterpart would give him all his knowledge and you would not have to return any. 
 
Figure 10: From the experiment: Sharing alternative. 
Investment stage 
In the investment stage the firms were asked to choose a level of investment. The subjects 
choose their level of investment simultaneously so they do not know what level the 
counterpart will choose. The cost of investment increases at a quadratic rate. The cost of 
investment was also given in this stage, with the cost of investment for every hundred 
increment of investment level.  
 
Figure 11: From the experiment: Investment Level. 
Product market/result stage 
The product market stage is in this experiment is also called the result stage. This is 
because in this stage the firms/subjects only get the result from the previous stages. This stage 
displays whether or not they have succeeded in R&D and whether or not their counterpart has 
succeeded. The subjects would also be informed about their total knowledge, the random 
draw and their counterparts’ R&D. This stage also informed the subjects about their payoff, 





Figure 12: From the experiment: Result payoff 
The appendix has a print out of every stage. Show the complete picture the subject got to 
see in every stage.   
4.4 Hypothesis 
H. 1. Subjects that exchange knowledge will implicitly cooperate on the R&D level. 
H. 2. Subjects behave risk averse. 
H. 3. Subjects behave loss averse. 
H. 4. Subjects that on average more frequently try to form cooperation with their 






The experiment generated (for the treatments considered in this thesis) 2560 observations, 
1280 were investment decision and 1280 were knowledge sharing request. These came from 
10 subjects over 16 periods in four different treatments, were all treatments were conducted 
twice. The statistical test that is used is a standard t-test. It could be argued that a more robust 
non-parametric test should be use here. However since t-tests are familiar to a wide audience, 
a non-parametric test is left for future work.  
5.1 Summary Statistics 
The experiment generated 540 observations of subjects choosing to share knowledge and 
740 observations of subjects not share knowledge. The Nash predictions and the mean 
observations, with standard deviations in parentheses, are summarized in Table 8 and 9.  
The analysis for the cases where subjects shared knowledge is summarized in Table 8. 
The model predicted investment levels below actually observed investment level. In every 
case the subjects overinvested compared to the Nash prediction. The subject overinvested 
regardless of market competition or initial endowment. 
With regard to profit, the actual profit is lower then the predicted profit, in all cases. The 
Subjects in the Moderate Symmetric case overinvested, but received a profit fairly close to the 
predicted value. The Laggards in Tough are the real losers for this group, earning almost 200 
less then the predicted value, they are also the only ones that receives a negative profit 
(earning -58 with the prediction of 141). 
Table 8: Results Sharing 
Market  Position R&D Profit   
    Nash Mean (sd) Nash Mean (sd) n 
Moderate Symmetric 226 341 (124) 313 308 (350) 188 
Soft Leader 300 337 (187) 515 483 (327) 70 
 
Laggard 300 416 (152) 315 287 (297) 70 
Moderate Leader 226 255 (198) 420 343 (396) 61 
  Laggard 226 365 (201) 220 161 (313) 61 
Tough Leader 162 256 (217) 341 233 (469) 45 





Continue with the subjects that did not share knowledge (Table 9). With symmetric initial 
endowments and Moderate market competition, the mean investment in this case was very 
close to the Nash prediction (557 with a prediction of 547). Even with the mean investment 
close to the Nash prediction the mean profit fell surprisingly short to the predicted profit (152 
with a prediction of 204). For the cases of Leader in the market competition of Soft, Moderate 
and Tough (all the cases) there were underinvestment compared to the Nash prediction (575 
with prediction 733 for Soft) (530 with prediction 780 for Moderate) (542 with prediction 800 
for Tough). On the contrary the Laggards overinvested for all the cases (Soft, Moderate and 
Tough) (600 with prediction 533 for Soft) (488 with prediction 314 for Moderate) (435 with 
prediction 0 for Tough).  
Table 9: Results NO Sharing 
Market  Position R&D Profit   
    Nash Mean (sd) Nash Mean (sd) n 
Moderate Symmetric 547 557 (175) 204 152 (379) 132 
Soft Leader 733 575 (227) 416 276 (369) 90 
  Laggard 533 600 (274) 142 149 (337) 90 
Moderate Leader 780 530 (216) 461 256 (409) 99 
 
Laggard 314 488 (248) 49 107 (349) 99 
Tough Leader 800 542 (169) 670 213 (478) 115 
  Laggard 0 435 (275) 0 -2 (329) 115 
 
With regard to the decision of sharing knowledge, there was some deviation from the 
predictions. The Nash prediction of dominant strategies told us that there should be sharing of 
knowledge in the symmetric Moderate treatment and asymmetric Soft treatment. Following, 
there should be no sharing for the asymmetric Moderate and Tough treatment. The only 
treatment, were subjects agreed to share knowledge more often then not, was the symmetric 
Moderate treatment (188 shared and 132 did not share). For all the asymmetric treatments the 
subjects did share less often than not (140 shared and 180 did not share for Soft) (122 shared 
and 198 did not share for Moderate) (90 shared 230 did not share for Tough). 
The asymmetric Soft treatment was the only treatment where the subjects did the opposite 
from the predicted behavior – even the Nash prediction predicted that subjects should share 
knowledge. This seems to indicate that when there is asymmetric sharing of initial 
knowledge, then the Leaders do not wish to give away their advantage, even if they benefited 




Looking back at the results of the experiment, based on the average profit, would the 
subjects be better off sharing knowledge or not to share knowledge? In the Symmetric 
Moderate treatment the average profit for subjects when sharing was 308 and when not 
sharing 152. On average the subjects would make twice as much profit from sharing than not 
sharing knowledge. The Nash equilibrium also concludes that the dominant strategy would be 
to share knowledge. 
In theory and the empirical results, Sharing is the dominant strategy. In the asymmetric 
Soft treatment the average profit for the subjects when sharing was 483 for Leaders and 287 
for Laggards, compared to not sharing was 276 for Leaders and 149 for Laggards. On average 
the Leaders and the Laggards would make nearly twice as much if he shared knowledge. For 
the asymmetric Soft treatment the dominant strategy and the high average pay off were both 
through sharing knowledge. For the asymmetric Moderate treatment the average profit for the 
subjects when sharing was 343 for Leaders and 161 for Laggards, when not sharing was 256 
for Leaders and 107 for Laggards. 
Again, both Leader and Laggard would be better of by sharing knowledge, Nash tells us 
the opposite. In the end more subjects wished not to share knowledge, even if they should 
have been better of by doing so. For the asymmetric Tough treatment the average profit for 
the subjects when sharing was 233 for Leaders and -58 for Laggards, when not sharing 213 
for Leaders and -2 for Laggards. For this treatment the Leader would be a little better off by 
sharing, but the Laggard would be a lot worse off by sharing. 
Ironically enough this is the reverse of the Nash predictions. The Leader should have done 
better by not sharing, but did better by sharing and the Laggard should have done better by 
sharing but did worse by sharing. In the end the Laggards and theory was against sharing, 
leading to not sharing being the most preferred strategy.  
In all cases in the experiment the Laggards overinvest. Laggards also overinvest more 
than Leaders.  
5.1. Team player and Individualist behavior.  
This section will continue the assumption raised in section 4.2.6 (Team players and 
Individualists). Subjects in every treatment are split into two groups, the Team player and the 




the mean investment between these two groups. The assumption is that mean of the 
Individualist subjects is different than for the Team player, hence a two-tail t-test is used. First 
I will analyze the cases where the subjects share knowledge. The p-value tells us on what 
significance level we can reject the null hypothesis that the means are equal.  
Table 10: Results: Team player and Individualist in Sharing 
Competition Role Mean investment (sd) 
     Team player Individualist p-value 
Moderate Symmetric 327 (102) 371 (162) 0,070 
Soft Leader 299 (163) 426 (209) 0,019** 
 
Laggard 370 (131) 466 (159) 0,008** 
Moderate Leader 209 (142) 314 (243) 0,053 
  Laggard 319 (152) 430 (243) 0,048* 
Tough Leader 239 (170) 283 (278) 0,559 
  Laggard 250 (186) 301 (224) 0,418 
** Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level.  
From Table 10 we can draw a few conclusions. For all treatments investments are 
strategic substitutes. From Table 10 the mean investment for Team player subjects is lower 
than for the Individualist subjects. For soft cases, the difference in means was significant at 
the 1% level. The Team player subjects seem to be less aggressive in investment, choosing an 
investment level that is more cooperative than the Individualist subjects. The moderate 
symmetric case fails to become statistical significant. In the asymmetric cases for moderate 
competition, the difference in means were significant for Laggards at the 5% level, the Leader 
fails just barely to become significant. From the cases of asymmetric Soft and Moderate the 
most significant data is for the Laggards. 
This is not necessary surprising, since the Laggards have the most to gain from sharing 
knowledge. The best way to get Leaders to wish to share knowledge in the future is choose an 
investment level that is good for both, so that Leaders in the future will be willing to share. 
The Tough cases were quite different. There were no significant difference between the Team 
player and the Individualist. Tough times do not seem to bring out the best in people. When 





Table 11: Results: Team player and Individualist in NO Sharing 
Competition Role Mean investment (sd) 
     Team player Individualist p-value 
Moderate Symmetric 531 (134) 576 (201) 0,126 
Soft Leader 573 (176) 575 (260) 0,958 
  Laggard 563 (261) 647 (286) 0,157 
Moderate Leader 433 (190) 588 (210) 0,0003** 
  Laggard 437 (272) 517 (229) 0,139 
Tough Leader 561 (196) 533 (156) 0,455 
  Laggard 404 (248) 452 (290) 0,347 
** Significant at the 1% level.  
Without sharing the story is quite different. Drawing any common conclusion is a lot 
harder than when subjects share knowledge. Testing for the difference of two means all but 
one was not significant at even the 10% level. The only significant difference that could be 
found was the Leaders in the Moderate case. Under Tough there is no statistical difference 
between Team player and Individualist subjects. For Leaders in Soft market there is no 
statistical difference between the Individualist and the Team players. They are actually 
surprisingly equal (they are equal at a 5% significant level!). The Individualists are the 
subjects that the most frequently try to form sharing. If a Team player Leader was rejected to 
exchange knowledge with a Laggard (knowledge sharing is a lot better for the Laggard), 
would the Team player really continue to be altruistic? This can be seen as the Team player 
Leader punishing the Laggard for not sharing knowledge.  
5.2 Risk aversion 
Risk aversion is often discounted as an anomaly (Rabin & Thaler, 2001). Anomaly or not, 
can it be used to explain the actions of the subjects in the experiment? Table 12 presents 
reviled preferences based on the cases of sharing of knowledge and Table 13 contains the 
cases for no sharing of knowledge. In these Tables the Prediction tells us what strategy a risk 
averse agent would choose. 
For the Sharing cases; the risk aversion model predicts that for symmetric/asymmetric 
Moderate market and the asymmetric Soft market subjects should overinvest, and in the 
asymmetric Tough market should underinvest. The observation from all the sharing cases was 
overinvestment. Hence we observe consistent with risk averse behavior for all but the 




Table 12: Results: Risk aversion in Sharing 
Market  Position R&D Risk aversion  
    Nash Mean (sd) Prediction Reviled preference 
Moderate Symmetric 226 341 (124) Over invest Risk averse 
Soft Leader 300 337 (187) Over invest Risk averse 
 
Laggard 300 416 (152) Over invest Risk averse 
Moderate Leader 226 255 (198) Over invest Risk averse 
  Laggard 226 365 (201) Over invest Risk averse 
Tough Leader 162 256 (217) Under invest Risk loving 
  Laggard 162 276 (205) Under invest Risk loving 
 
For the no sharing cases, the model preformed considerably worse than for sharing. The 
model had only one correct prediction (Laggards in Soft). The symmetric moderate case 
preformed fairly well. Since the mean investment is close to the Nash prediction, the subjects 
are risk neutral and indistinguishable from to weak risk aversion (and risk loving).  
Table 13: Results: Risk aversion in NO Sharing 
Market  Position R&D Risk aversion 
    Nash Mean (sd) Prediction Reviled preference 
Moderate Symmetric 547 557 (175) Under invest Risk neutral 
Soft Leader 733 575 (227) Over invest Risk loving 
  Laggard 533 600 (274) Over invest Risk averse 
Moderate Leader 780 530 (216) Over invest Risk loving 
 
Laggard 314 488 (248) Under invest Risk loving 
Tough Leader 800 542 (169) Nash Risk loving 
  Laggard 0 435 (275) Nash Risk loving 
 
For the cases were the benchmark predicted underinvestment the model predicted poorly. 
That a risk averse subject should underinvest seems counter intuitive. Only through in depth 
analysis can we conclude that a subject should underinvest to reduce risk. But it does not 
reduce the variance of the profit.  
Unfortunately risk aversion did not offer a good explanation for the subject’s behavior. As 
a matter of fact, the model only predicted correctly in 6 out of 14 cases. This model is based 
on the assumption that your opponent chooses his Nash equilibrium. For the subjects the risk 




Because of this the subjects probably did not realize the effects of all their actions. Another 
effect is the risk the subjects faces that their opponent does not play Nash R&D. If your 
opponent does not play their Nash equilibrium, then the risk profile of your investment in 
R&D changes. This analysis has not taken this into account because of the share complexity 
of the problem. This problem will be left for future analysis.
5
 
5.2.1 Alternative risk aversion 
This section follows the same argument as the chapter above (chapter 6.2) using the 
alternative risk aversion model. The only difference with the alternative explanation model is 
that it predicted overinvestment for Leader and Laggards in the Tough sharing cases and for 
Symmetric NO Sharing cases. Since risk aversion has been gone through in detail in chapter 
5.2 it will not be reviewed here.  
Table 14: Result: Alternative risk aversion 
Sharing  
  
No Sharing  
 Competition Role Risk aversion 
 
Competition Role Risk aversion 
    Prediction  Follwed 
 
    Prediction  Follwed 
Moderate Symmetric Over invest Yes 
 
Moderate Symmetric Over invest Yes 
Soft Leader Over invest Yes 
 
Soft Leader Over invest No 
  Laggard Over invest Yes 
  
Laggard Over invest Yes 
Moderate Leader Over invest Yes 
 
Moderate Leader Over invest No 
 
Laggard Over invest Yes 
 
  Laggard Under invest No 
Tough Leader Over invest Yes 
 
Tough Leader Nash No 
  Laggard Over invest Yes 
 
  Laggard Nash No 
 
Table 14 displays the prediction of risk aversion and if they subjects followed the 
predictions. The alternative risk aversion model has three more correct predictions than the 
other risk aversion model, 9 of 14 correct. All correct for the Sharing cases.  
5.3 Loss aversion 
This section is closely linked to subjects’ over- or underinvestment.  Hence I will refer to 
the Table in section 6.2 to reveal who over- or underinvest. The loss aversion model is build 
so if    is positive, and then subjects would be classified as loss averse. If    is negative, then 
the subjects are “loss lovers”. Equation (19) in 4.2.5 has been used to calculate the monetary 
loss of failure. Firstly I will go through the cases for knowledge sharing. Based the on the 




that being unsuccessful was equal to losing 435. Since the subjects overinvested, this would 
reduce their expected profit but increase their chance of success. From Table 15 we observe 
that all the values of feeling of loss are positive. All the subjects in the sharing cases can be 
classified as loss averse. From Table 15 we observe two relations. Firstly, the subjects 
become more loss averse as market competition intensifies. Why this is the case is not 
immediately clear because when competition intensifies, there is less shared payoff in the 
product market. The Laggard is more loss averse than the Leader. All Laggards in the sharing 
cases overinvest more then the Leader. Presumably the Laggard feels that he is behind and 
must invest more to compete. Hence the Laggard would consider failure worse than the 
Leader.  
Table 15: Results: Loss aversion in Sharing 
Competition Role Feeling of loss 
Moderate Symmetric 435 
Soft Leader 190 
 
Laggard 269 
Moderate Leader 263 
  Laggard 373 
Tough Leader 520 
  Laggard 540 
 
The values in Table 15 are lower for all cases than the values in Table 16. The valuating 
of loss in the Symmetric Moderate case is only 16. This is very low compared to any 
monetary loss in the sharing cases. Since the subjects invested close to their Nash equilibrium 
this is consistent with a low valuation of loss. Hence loss aversion does not seem to play a 
major role in the Symmetric Moderate market. 
The asymmetric cases are different. Before interpreting these results for loss aversion in 
the asymmetric NO sharing cases, a quick review of the results of the experiment is needed 
(Table 9). For every type of market in NO Sharing the Leader underinvested and the Laggard 
overinvested. The best response for a Laggard is to overinvest if the Leader underinvests. 
Since the monetary value of loss for the Laggard in Soft and Moderate is close to zero, the 
Laggard chooses the Nash best response to the Leaders level of R&D. The Leader on the 
other hand would have to be classified as “loss lovers”. Being a “loss lover” is irrational. So 




Since the Laggard did not invest according to Nash, the Leader would respond by reduce 
his investment level (because investments are strategic complements). The most likely reason 
is that the Leaders overcompensated their reduction in investment. Doing this would lead 
them to be classified as “loss lovers”, even if the reason for underinvestment comes from not 
knowing the response for the Laggards.  
Table 16: Results: Loss aversion in NO Sharing 
Competition Role Feeling of loss 
Moderate Symmetric 16 
Soft Leader -125 
 
Laggard -12 
Moderate Leader -128 
  Laggard -1 
Tough Leader -23 
  Laggard 177 
 
There is more loss aversion observed in Sharing than no Sharing. This observation can be 
explained by the fact that the probability for failure in Sharing is lower than for no Sharing. 
Hence loss averse subjects would share knowledge to reduce their chances for failure rather 
than do-it-alone (no Sharing). Summing up, this loss aversion model has more explanatory 
power in the Sharing cases than the NO Sharing cases.  
5.4 Cooperation 
Thy way this experiment was constructed cooperating would be extremely difficult. Two 
factors worked against the subjects: First, the subjects choose their level of investment at the 
same time, giving subjects the incentive to deviate from a cooperative equlibrium. Second, the 
subjects would be paired up with a random opponent every period. There was no indication of 
who their opponent was. Not only did this work against the subjects, but this design is 
specifically made to make sure that subjects do not cooperate. Cooperation on the other hand, 






Table 17: Results: Cooperation in Sharing 
Competition Role R&D Profit   
    Nash Coop Mean (sd) Nash Coop Mean (sd) n 
Moderate Symmetric 226 260 341 (124) 313 317 308 (350) 188 
Soft Leader 300 360 337 (187)* 515 524 483 (327) 70 
  Laggard 300 360 416 (152) 315 324 287 (297) 70 
Moderate Leader 226 260 255 (198)* 420 424 343 (396) 61 
 
Laggard 226 260 365 (201) 220 224 161 (313) 61 
Tough Leader 162 180 256 (217) 341 342 233 (469) 45 
  Laggard 162 180 276 (205) 141 142 -58 (78) 45 
* 5% significance level 
Table 18: Results: Cooperation in NO Sharing 
Competition Role R&D Profit   
    Nash Coop Mean (sd) Nash Coop Mean (sd) n 
Moderate Symmetric 547 900/0 557 (175) 204 525 / 30 152 (379) 132 
Soft Leader 733 800 575 (227) 416 680 276 (369) 90 
  Laggard 533 0 600 (274) 142 0 149 (337) 90 
Moderate Leader 780 800 530 (216) 461 680 256 (409) 99 
  Laggard 314 0 488 (248) 49 0 107 (349) 99 
Tough Leader 800 800 542 (169) 680 680 213 (478) 115 
  Laggard 0 0 435 (275) 0 0 -2 (329) 115 
 
The Table above shows there are only two cases where the subjects investment levels 
were not significantly (at even the 10% level) different from the cooperation level. The 
Leader in Soft and Moderate cases with Sharing had significant investment level to maximize 
joint profit. For the no sharing cases there were no level even close to cooperation. 
This is not exactly surprising because of the enormous asymmetry cooperation predicted. 
Laggards were not willing to not invest so that their counterpart could capture the market. 
With so few cooperation observed one can conclude that was a whole there was no 
cooperation in this experiment.  
In sharing there is not much extra profit to gain by setting a cooperative R&D level. This 





6. Discussion / Conclusion 
The analysis and comparisons completed, we can now address the predictions of the 
experiment and answer if any anomalies were observed. In this thesis, these predictions have 
been discussed in relation to actual behavior through this experiment. How did the different 
market conditions affect predictions? What differences did asymmetric initial knowledge lead 
to? 
The predictions and results for Treatment 1 (symmetric treatment) gave by far the most 
consistent results. The subjects showed tendencies to risk aversion in the whole treatment. 
Loss aversion was also prominent, with positive values of loss aversion for both Sharing and 
NO Sharing.  For the No Sharing case the subjects invested fairly close to their Nash 
equilibrium. In this Treatment subjects over average decided to share knowledge, which in 
return gave them higher profits.  
Treatment 2 (asymmetric Soft) also gave results that were fairly consistent with the 
prediction models. Risk aversion were observed in three of the four different outcomes 
(Leader/Laggard and Sharing/NO Sharing). Loss aversion only held for the sharing case, 
subjects were a lot closer to Nash in the sharing cases. In this treatment we should have 
expected more sharing of knowledge, as the subjects should in theory and in practice be better 
off by Sharing.  
Treatment 3 (asymmetric Moderate) had dominant strategy (in theory and practice) to 
share knowledge, but the subjects opted not to share knowledge. This treatment showed risk 
aversion and loss aversion for the sharing case, but risk loving and loss loving strategies for 
the NO sharing cases. This is due to overinvestment from the Laggard and underinvestment 
from the Leader. This can be interpreted as the breakdown of the model. Subjects seemed to 
prefer NO sharing (which was the Nash equilibrium). 
Treatment 4 (asymmetric Tough) was the treatment that was hardest to predict. Especially 
in the NO sharing case, with massive overinvestment from the Laggard and massive 
underinvestment from the Leader none of the analysis gave any reasonable explanation for 
this case.  Again for the sharing case the subjects “behaved” well, with risk aversion and loss 




It could be that Laggards with a sense of fairness wishes to punish Leaders who do not 
wish to share knowledge. This is unfortunately not investigated in this thesis. This could be 
investigated in another experiment. An experiment could force subjects to share knowledge 
(or force them to not share knowledge) for the first half. Thereafter give them the option to 
share knowledge in the second half. There could be different investment levels when the 
subjects themselves choose sharing agreements.  
Hypothesis 1: Subjects that exchange knowledge will implicitly cooperate on the R&D 
level. Cooperative investment level was only observed in two cases in this experiment, for the 
Leader in sharing Soft and Moderate markets. Because of so few observations of cooperative 
investment levels we reject the hypothesis that the subjects were cooperating. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects behave risk averse. Risk aversion for expected utility performed 
better than mean variance risk aversion. The risk aversion hypothesis (for expected utility) 
held for the sharing cases, but only for two of the seven NO Sharing cases. For the sharing 
cases the subjects were willing to reduce expected profit, thereby increasing the chances of 
receiving a smaller payoff.  
Hypothesis 3: Subjects behave loss averse. Loss aversion can only be said to hold for the 
sharing cases, but again it did not hold for the NO Sharing cases.  
Hypothesis 4: Subjects that on average more frequently try to form cooperation with their 
counterpart will choose a more cooperative level of R&D. This hypothesis held for nearly all 
sharing cases. For all but the Tough cases, the Team players chose a less aggressive 
investment level than the Individualists (two of these cases just barely missed being 
significant at the 5% level). The Tough case was not significant at all. For the NO Sharing 
cases all but one did not show any significant difference between Team players and 
Individualists. The Leader in the Moderate case showed a significant difference in investment. 
It is not clear why. 
Hypothesis 1 was rejected. Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 all held for the sharing cases (with a few 
exceptions for hypothesis 4). Why did not the hypothesis hold in all cases? There can be 
several reasons why these hypotheses failed. The classification of these anomalies is based on 
experiments that were specifically designed to test for anomalies, testing for only one 
anomaly at the time. There could be specific conditions that need to be met for some 




models. There could be logical error along the way. The supporting assumptions might be 
wrong.  
On the empirical side, with the experiment only lasting for 16 periods, it might be that the 
subjects did not have enough experience and time to figure out their best strategy. Subjects 
only had 30 seconds to reach their decisions. There are a few other factors that should be 
mentioned that could affect the outcome of this experiment. There was limited liability for the 
subjects participating in this experiment. Hence the subjects could never loose money by 
participating. If the subjects were unsure what to do the “Trembling hand” effects could come 
in to play (Selten, 1983). Other effects could be bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). K-level 
thinking could also have been present in this experiment (Crawford & Iriberri, 2007).  
This is not as conclusive an answer that I would have liked to present. However, since the 
sharing decision and the investment decision were different than predicted by the Nash 
equilibrium there seems to be some anomalies present. Though finding and classifying them 
is a different matter. 
With the argument that there might be special conditions that cause certain anomalies, 
there could be indications from this experiment that either loss aversion or risk aversion are 
more prominent when subjects cooperate (in this experiment share knowledge) or there is 
some anomaly that is not accounted for when the subjects do not cooperate, or maybe both. 
Further research of interest would be to investigate under what conditions anomalies are 
observed. If economists can predict under what conditions different anomalies will occur, this 
could be one step in the process to develop new models.  
Since this experiment simulates the interaction of firms in an invention race, there are 
other alternatives that could be interesting to look in to. With firms that do investment some 
go bankrupt, and bad firms are removed from the market. What could be interesting is to 
invite back the subjects that performed over average (representing firms that did not fail), and 
have them play the experiment again. This could investigate if there is more stability in 
markets where bad firms are allowed to fail.  
What can experimental economics do for theory? And, what can theory do for 
experimental economics? Many economists in many papers have tried to answer these 




that experiments should be used to discriminate between alternative theories and to test the 
robustness of single relevant theories. They comment that experiments could be used for 
several nonscientific purposes. Vernon L. Smith (1989) argues that the results gathered by 
experiments should make us skeptical of both the theory and the evidence, to make us seek 
improvements for both theory and the methods of testing. Larry Samuelson (Samuelson, 
2005) also argues that economic theory and economic experiments can be combined to 
benefit both economic theory and experimental economics. More importantly he argues that 
we can use experiments not just to test theory, but also to investigate other issues of economic 
importance.  
Anomalies violate standard theory. In many cases there are no obvious way of 
incorporating them into theory. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) argues that either there 
is too little known about specific anomalies or that incorporating them in to general models 
would greatly increase the complexity of theory.  
This thesis provides a vivid illustration of the many problems that may occur in the 
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8. End note 
1) Figured created by myself. 
2) Taken from (Lakshminarayanan, et al., 2011), presenting Tversky and Kahnemans’ 
problem. 
3) Figure taken from (Lakshminarayanan, et al., 2011). 
4) This graph is taken from (http://randomly-
walking.blogspot.com/2010_08_01_archive.html)  
5) Analysis of strategic interaction with bounded rationality could be pursued using the 






9. Appendix  
Cumulative probability function expanded.  
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Derivate and set equal to zero 
    
   
                                                
   
                                  
           
 
   
        
                   
           
 
   
         
                         





        
              
   
   
 
             
           
   
 
   
         
                         
           
 
   
                       
          
                       
           
           
 
           
 
   
                                     
                                 
            
             
  
   
                                     
                                   
          
   
             
  
     
               
 
             
   
                                     
                             
             
  
   
                                     
                             
             
 








Screen shoots from the experiments 
 
Figure 13: From the experiment: Cooperation Screen 
 
 










Mean variance graphs 
 





Figure 17: Mean risk aversion Soft 
 





Figure 19: Mean risk aversion Tough 
